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Abstract
This study investigates the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on
educational attainment and earnings by exploiting a policy change that exempted a
complete birth cohort from military service. We find that compulsory military service
decreases the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points from
a baseline of 12.3 per cent. In addition, being a conscript reduces the probability of
obtaining a university degree by almost four percentage points. The effect of military
service on earnings is also negative and long-lasting. Approximately 18 years after
military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent. The effect of
conscription on educational attainment does not fully explain the wage reduction.
Jel classification: H56; J31; J24
Keywords: Military conscription; Long-term earnings; Human capital; University
enrolment
1 Introduction
Many countries have a military draft that compels large populations of young men to
spend a substantial period of time in military service. Conscripts typically have to serve
in the army in a period of their life in which decisions on human capital investments
are taken. A compulsory military draft might harm investments in human capital and
reduce life time earnings. A number of recent studies have investigated the effect of
military service on educational attainment or the effect on wages. Remarkably, these stud-
ies do not provide a consistent picture of the effects of military service. For instance,
military service seems to decrease educational attainment in the UK (Buonanno 2006)
and Italy (Cipollone and Rosolia 2007)1 but increase completion of tertiary education in
Germany (Bauer et al. 2014), France (Maurin and Xenogiani 2007) and in the US (Card
and Lemieux 2001) because of draft avoidance behaviours. In addition, military service
seems to reduce wages in the US (Angrist 1990; Angrist and Krueger 1994) and in the
Netherlands (Imbens and van der Klaauw 1995), but in Germany (Bauer et al. 2012), there
is no effect on wages. In the US, the negative effects seem to fade away over time (Angrist
et al. 2011). Moreover, the importance of education as a mediating channel for the long
run effects on earnings remains unclear (Bauer et al. 2012).
This paper aims to provide new evidence by investigating the long term effects of mili-
tary conscription on educational attainment and wages in the Netherlands. Investigating
the effects of military conscription is difficult because those that have served might differ
© 2015 Hubers and Webbink; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
Hubers and Webbink IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:10 Page 2 of 16
from those that have not served. Despite the fact that military conscription was compul-
sory for all men in the Netherlands, only 40 per cent of each birth cohort actually served
in the military. Those who were recruited were selected from a larger population and
the various decisions made in this selection process are unobserved. This might induce
selection bias if we compare the outcomes of those who served in the military with the
outcomes of those that did not serve in the military.
To address this selection problem, we exploit a policy change that created a major dif-
ference in conscription between birth cohorts. In 1979, the age that Dutch young men
were called for military service was lowered from 20 to 19. The direct consequence of
this policy change was that a whole birth cohort was exempted from military service. We
identify the causal effect of military service by comparing the long term outcomes of this
exempted birth cohort with the outcomes of those born in the adjacent years. This local
comparison enables us to generate two types of estimates. First, reduced form estimates
of the difference between the exempted cohort and the adjacent cohorts that received
the regular treatment of conscription provide a direct estimate of the societal costs of a
system of conscription. The societal costs might consist of a lower educated population
with a lower earnings capacity. Second, instrumental variable estimates show the effect
of conscription for males that actually served in the army. These estimates for the com-
pliers provide insight into the private costs of conscription. This approach is related to
earlier work by Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995). They introduced an instrumental vari-
able approach that exploits all variation in conscription between fourteen birth cohorts
for obtaining estimates of the short term wage effects for conscripts. We also apply their
approach for testing the robustness of our main results on the long term effects of con-
scription on three education outcomes and wages using micro-level data from 1997 to
2002. Moreover, data on educational attainment and earnings of women enable us to
perform a placebo test about the influence of other time related confounding factors.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the effects of military service. First,
by exploiting variation in conscription that is transparent and arguably exogenous in a
local approach, we are able to obtain estimates of both the societal and private costs of
a system of compulsory military service. Second, we are able to trace the effects of con-
scription on investment in human capital. In particular, we are able to investigate the
effects of military conscription on completion of university education. We find that the
system of compulsory military service decreases the proportion of university graduates
by 1.5 percentage points from a baseline of 12.3 per cent. In addition, being a conscript
reduces the probability of obtaining a university degree by almost four percentage points.
Third, we investigate the long term effects of conscription on the average societal wages
and the wages of conscripts. We find that the system of military service reduces average
societal wages by 1.5 per cent. In addition, conscripts lose approximately four per cent of
their wages by serving in the military. This suggests that the negative effects of military
service are long-lasting. Finally, we investigate to what extent the wage costs of conscrip-
tion can be explained by the decrease in investment in human capital. We find that the
effect of conscription on educational attainment does not fully explain the wage reduc-
tion. This suggests that conscription also reduces individual earnings capacity through
channels other than a reduction in human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section will provide back-
ground information about military conscription in the Netherlands. Section 3 discusses
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previous research on the effects of military conscription. Section 4 explains our empirical
strategy. The data are described in Section 5. Section 6 shows the main estimation results,
and Section 7 shows the results of several sensitivity tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
The Netherlands has had a system of military conscription for almost two centuries. It
was introduced by Napoleon in 1810 when the Netherlands was under French rule. It was
only in the 1990s that Dutch politicians started seriously questioning the need for a large
drafted army. The fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War had diminished
the fear for a military invasion. Eventually, military conscription was abandoned in the
Netherlands in 19972.
Military conscription is part of the political ideal of the nation-state, in which all citizens
alike have the duty to protect their fatherland. The advantages of the draft system for
the state are evident; the supply of cheap labour provides the state with a large army.
However, the military conscription system is also criticized. First, the draft system might
induce an inefficient match of jobs and people. Recruits are rather arbitrarly allocated to
a job without proper consideration of productivity, comparative advantages and outside
options (Lau et al. 2004). This inefficiency might also be linked to the fact that serving in
the military was for many recruits a long period of boredom (Duindam 1995). The second
implication of the draft is that it can be regarded as a hidden tax, unequally distributed
among the population. The state forces young men to work for a certain amount of
time for wages that are probably much lower than they could have earned in the labour
market. This difference can be regarded as a tax for the young men that have to serve
(Lau et al. 2004; Poutvaara and Wagener 2007; Poutvaara and Wagener 2011).
In this study, we investigate the long term effects of the Dutchmilitary draft system from
the period between 1970 and 1990. Since the Netherlands was not involved in any wars
during this period, our analysis is about the effects of peace time conscription. During
this period, the military consisted of almost 50 per cent conscripts. At the age of 17,
Dutch males received a letter from the Dutch Ministry of Defence about the registration
as a recruit and duties and procedures of conscription3. The medical and psychological
examination took place in the year the potential recruit turned 18. On average, 30 per
cent of the potential recruits were immediately exempted from military service. The rea-
sons to be exempted varied. These could be serious medical conditions or ‘psychological
instability’ but also less obvious ‘medical conditions’ such as being at least 2 meters tall.
The ‘psychological instability’ exemption became notorious since many attempted to be
exempted via this route by pretending to be mentally ill. Those who passed the medi-
cal examinations were considered fit to serve and were supposed to wait until they were
called for service. During this period, the recruit could still opt for other reasons to be
exempted. Some reasons to be exempted were being enrolled in tertiary education or
being the sole breadwinner in the household. Althoughmost exemptions were temporary,
in practice, they often became full exemptions since men were rarely called for service
after their 26th birthday. A special case was the conscientious objector, who refused to
perform military service out of principle. Conscientious objectors were granted an alter-
native social or civilian conscription. Those considered fit to serve were called for military
service in the year they turned 19. The recruits that were called for service generally
served in the military for 14 months. About 15 per cent of the recruits were invited to
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be trained as officers. This meant slightly better pay, but also serving for 16 instead of
14 months.
From 1969, the military was confronted with a structural surplus of recruits, caused
both by a decreased demand – a result of budget cuts which allowed amaximum of 45,000
recruits annually – and an increasing supply of recruits because of the post-war birth wave
(Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker 1994). A number of policies were implemented to reduce
this surplus. The first was the introduction of the so called ‘special exemption’ category,
which consisted of a random selection of men from those who were fit to serve. Being
‘specially exempted’ implied that the recruit was not called for duty except in the case of
an emergency. The second policy was a change in the conscription age, which was lowered
from 20 to 19 from 1979 onwards. Although the official reason for this change in policy
was to improve the transition from secondary school tomilitary service, an important side
effect was that birth cohort 1959 was completely exempted frommilitary service. In 1978
all those turning 20 that year were called for military service (birth cohort 1958) while in
1979 all those turning 19 were called for service (birth cohort 1960). We will exploit this
shock in our empirical model.
3 Previous studies
3.1 Conscription and educational attainment
Several studies have assessed the effects of military conscription on educational attain-
ment. In general, the evidence seems mixed as some studies report a negative effect of
military conscription, whereas other studies find that military conscription induces an
increase of enrolment in tertiary education. Keller et al. (2009) compare European coun-
tries since the 1960s and find a strong negative association between enrolment in tertiary
education and the share of recruits in a country. Buonanno (2006) finds that that exemp-
tion from military service in the UK increases educational attainment by approximately
a quarter of a year. However, for Italy, no effect of military conscription on enrolment in
tertiary education is found, except for recruits from lower socio-economic backgrounds
(Di Pietro 2013). Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) exploit regional variation in military con-
scription in Italy and find that military conscription also has a negative impact on male
high school graduation. Remarkably, they also find a positive effect on graduation rates of
girls from the same areas and cohorts. Positive effects of military conscription on com-
pletion of tertiary education have been reported for France (Maurin and Xenogiani 2007),
for the US (Card and Lemieux 2001) and for Germany (Bauer et al. 2014). These effects
seem to be driven by draft avoidance behaviour.
3.2 Conscription and earnings
A number of studies have focused on the effect of military conscription on future wages.
These studies find mixed effects, ranging from zero to a negative effect. Imbens and van
der Klaauw (1995) find that being conscripted in the Netherlands reduces earnings ten
years after conscription by almost 5 per cent. Findings for the United Kingdom suggest
that military conscription reduces wages by 4 to 7 per cent (Buonanno 2006). However,
several other studies do not find an effect of military conscription on wages. For instance,
Grenet et al. (2010) do not find a reduction of wages for conscripts in the United Kingdom.
In addition, peace time conscription seems not to harm future wages in Germany (Bauer
et al. 2014, 2012). Moreover, for Australian recruits no negative wage effects have been
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found for military conscription in the Vietnam-era (Siminski 2013). For the US, there
seems to be a negative short term effect that fades out over time. Angrist (1990) shows that
ten years after service during the VietnamWar, veterans earn 15 per cent less than those
who didn’t serve. However, in the long run, these adverse consequences of conscription
seem to fade out (Angrist et al. 2011). A study of the medium and long term effects of
conscription in the Second World War finds no significant differences between veterans
and non-veterans (Angrist and Krueger 1994).
In sum, previous empirical studies suggests that military service, both in peace time
as in war time, has either no effect or a negative effect on future earnings. The negative
effects might result from the effect of conscription on human capital. Conscription might
diminish individual returns on human capital, which in turn affects the future wages of
a recruit (Lau et al. 2004; Poutvaara and Wagener 2007; Poutvaara and Wagener 2011).
Youngmen are typically called for military service during a period of their lives that would
otherwise be devoted to learning or gaining work experience. In addition, human capital
accumulated before the draft might depreciate during military service. If military service
causes a break in the educational career, it is likely that more time will be needed for
completion of tertiary education and might therefore reduce the probability of enrolment
and completion of tertiary education. On the other hand, the conscription system in the
Netherlands gave recruits the opportunity to postpone their military service duties until
they finished their tertiary education. In practice, this often led to a full exemption as
a recruit older than 26 was considered too old to serve in the military (Hoffenaar and
Schoenmaker 1994). Draft-avoidance behaviour may therefore just as well have led to an
increase in enrolment in tertiary education in the Netherlands.
4 Empirical strategy
This study aims to estimate the effect of military conscription on education and wages.
The most straightforward way to estimate the effect of conscription would be to regress
the outcome variables on a dummy variable for serving in the military using the following
equation:
Yi = β0 + β1Si + β2Xi + εi, (1)
in which Yi is the dependent variable, for instance earnings or education, Si is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if individual i served in the military and 0 otherwise and Xi is a vec-
tor of covariates. The regression above would give an unbiased estimate if serving in the
military could be considered as a random event. This is unlikely to be the case because of
the complicated selection procedures and the various opportunities to be exempted from
military service. For instance, individuals with specific – unobserved – skills may have
been more successful in exploiting these exemptions than others. We may therefore not
assume that Si is uncorrelated with εi.
To address this endogeneity problem, we exploit a policy change that exempted a com-
plete birth cohort from being conscripted. From 1979 onwards, the age that men were
called for military conscription was lowered from 20 to 19. As a consequence, the com-
plete birth cohort of 1959 was exempted from military service. Hence, this policy change
creates a transparent counterfactual for regular cohorts that had to serve in the army. This
variation can be considered as random because it is driven by a governmental decision
which is likely to be unrelated with individual (unobserved) factors. We can assess the
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effect of conscription by comparing the outcomes of the cohorts born around 1959. For
this comparison, we estimate reduced form models that include a dummy for being born
in 1959 (bc1959i) and controls for a smooth function age (f (Ai)) and other covariates (Xi):
Yi = δ0 + δ1bc1959i + f (Ai) + δ2Xi + νi (2)
The parameter δ1 captures the effect of being born in 1959. This effect can be attributed
to the system of conscription if we assume that the schooling and earnings capabilities of
males born in 1959 are not different from the capabilities of males born in the adjacent
years before and after 1959. If bc1959i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is
born in 1959 and 0 otherwise, the estimates of δ1 can be interpreted as the societal effect
of not having a system of compulsory military service. For instance, if the average wage of
males born in 1959 are higher than the wages of those born in adjacent years, this can be
interpreted as the societal costs of a system of conscription. The adjacent cohorts would
have earned the same wages as males born in 1959 if there had not been a system of com-
pulsory military service. It should be noted that the policy change exploited in this paper
creates a discontinuity in the probability of serving in the army that had a duration of one
year only. After this year, the probability of serving in the army returned to the regular
level. In the standard regression discontinuity models, as for instance applied by Bauer
et al. (2012), the probability of serving in the army only changes once. Our application
provides the opportunity to use before and after cohorts for comparisons. This makes the
estimates less vulnerable for functional form assumptions, for instance, about the speci-
fication of age. In addition, we can apply a local approach by using discontinuity samples
of birth cohorts around 1959 for our estimation4. Estimation of Equation (2) is based on
the exclusion restriction that the change in outcomes between birth cohort 1959 and the
adjacent birth cohorts can be fully attributed to military conscription. In our sensitiv-
ity analysis, we will test this assumption by investigating differences between cohorts of
women that were not subject to the conscription laws.
Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) applied an approach in which the proportion of men
that served in a specific birth cohort (S¯i) was used as an instrument:
Si = α0 + α1S¯i + f (Ai) + α2Xi + εi
Yi = β0 + β1Sˆi + f (Ai) + β2Xi + ηi
(3)
An innovative feature of the IV-approach of Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) is that
they were able to apply this approach without observing whether an individual had served
in the army. Their key insight is that the expectation of Si conditional on the proportion
that served from their birth cohort and covariates is equal to the proportion of the birth
cohort that actually served because all regressors remain constant within each cohort,
hence E(Si|S¯iXi) = S¯i. This implies that α1 = 1, α0 = α2 = 0, and Sˆi = α1S¯i = S¯i. Hence,
the causal effect of conscription can be estimated with the following equation:
Yi = β0 + β1S¯i + f (Ai) + β2Xi + ηi (4)
Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) estimated this equation using aggregated wage data
(monthly birth cohort averages) from1989 and 1990.Wewill estimate a local approach of the
model of 1995, focussing on birth cohort 1959 and the adjacent cohorts. This approach is
similar to Equation (2) but uses S¯i instead of the variable bc 1959i. For the estimation, we
use discontinuity samples that include only one, two or three birth cohorts around 1959.
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In our sensitivity analysis, we replicate the models of Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995)
to test our main assumptions by performing ‘placebo tests’ using data of women.
In sum, we estimate reduced form models of the effect of conscription on education
and wages (Equation (2)). These estimates can be interpreted as the societal impact of
conscription. In addition, we estimate the long term effects for conscripts by using an
instrumental variable approach (Equation (4)).
5 Data
The data that are used in the analysis come from the so-called Wage Structure Survey
(LSO)5 that includes individual-level data onwages, education and background character-
istics. Data on wages are obtained through the annual survey on employment and wages
among firms and partly through administrative data on the insured workers. This means
that all information on wages comes from administrative sources (firms or administra-
tive data on insured people). This dataset also contains information on gender, age and
job characteristics. Data on education are obtained from the annual labour force survey
and are matched with the wage data. This matched data-set is called the Wage Structure
Survey. We obtained data from the surveys of 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2002. These yearly
surveys consist of approximately 125,000 individuals.
5.1 The outcome variable
For our first outcome variable, educational attainment, we can use three indicators: years
of education and completion of two types of tertiary education (higher professional edu-
cation or university education). Education is measured with a 16-point scale which is
translated into years of education. Dutch tertiary education consists of two levels: higher
professional education and university education. The first type of tertiary education has
a vocational orientation and is considered to be the lowest level. University education has
an academic orientation. Our second outcome variable is (log) annual wages. Our data
contain the gross annual wages of 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2002. The data on wages from
1995-1997 have been converted from guilders to euros.
5.2 The independent variable
In the analysis, we exploit variation in the proportion of conscripts between birth cohorts
for identifying the effect of conscription. The year of birth has been registered in our data.
In addition, we use information on gender and the year of the survey. Information about
the proportion of males per birth cohort that served in the army was derived from Imbens
and van der Klaauw (1995), who obtained this information from the Dutch Ministry of
Defense. Data for the years since 1969 proved not to be available at the Dutch Ministry
of Defense. The proportion of men that served in the army for the birth cohorts 1956 to
1969 is shown in Figure 1. The proportion of men that received a special exemption status
is shown in Figure 2.
Summary statistics of themain variables are shown in Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4. These
statistics also give a first impression of the effect of conscription on educational attain-
ment and earnings. Table 1 shows summary statistics after pooling the four yearly LSO
datasets. The four columns show the means for males born in 1959 and the means for the
two, four or six adjacent male birth cohorts. We observe that males born in 1959 more
often complete tertiary education, especially university education, than males born in the
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Figure 1 Proportion of Dutch men that served in the military by birth cohort.
adjacent years (columns (2), (3) and (4)). In addition, we observe that the annual earnings
of males born in 1959 are higher than the annual earnings of those born in the adjacent
birth cohorts. Figure 3 shows the proportion of the Dutch population that completed ter-
tiary education by birth cohort. The vertical bars are based on a regression of completion
of tertiary education on birth cohort adjusted for a quadratic function of age. We observe
that birth cohort 1959 deviates most from the expected value based on the age profile.
Figure 4 shows the gross average wages ofmen per birth cohort. This graph is based on the
combined LSO data of, respectively, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2002. As in Figure 2, the bars in
Figure 4 are based on a regression of wages on birth cohorts adjusted for a quadratic func-
tion of age. Figure 4 shows that the average annual income for those born in 1959 is above
the earnings prediction based on a quadratic age curve. The summary statistics shown
in Table 1 and in Figures 3 and 4 suggest a negative effect of conscription on educational
attainment and earnings.
6 Main estimation results
This section shows the estimates of the models that only exploit the variation due to the
policy change that exempted all men born in 1959 from military service. The estimates
are obtained by using local discontinuity samples of one, two or three years around the
exempted cohort.
Figure 2 Proportion of Dutch men in the category ‘Special Exemption’ by birth cohort.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conscription No Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort Cohort 1959 ± 1 cohort ± 2 cohorts ± 3 cohorts
Age 38.1 38.0 38.0 38.1
Years of completed education 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.2
Tertiary education (%) 34.4 32.6 32.6 32.6
Higher professional education (%) 22.1 21.7 21.8 21.8
University degree (%) 12.3 10.8 10.8 10.8
Gross annual wages (in 1000 euro) 28.5 28.0 28.0 28.0
Served in the army (%) 0 44.1 39.9 39.4
Special exemption status (%) 0 3.5 5.9 7.7
Note: Columns (2), (3) and (4) contain, respectively, one, two or three cohorts before and after birth cohort 1959, but do not
include cohort 1959.
6.1 Conscription and educational attainment
Table 2 shows the estimated effects of military conscription on educational attainment
using the local approach. We use three different schooling outcomes: years of completed
schooling (top panel), obtaining a degree of higher professional education (middle panel)
and obtaining a university degree (bottom panel). Asmentioned before, tertiary education
in the Netherlands consists of two levels: higher professional education and university
education. We look specifically at the effects on tertiary education as the transition from
secondary education coincides with the period that Dutch conscripts are called to serve in
the army. In addition, completion of tertiary education might be a route for avoiding mil-
itary conscription. Each panel of Table 2 shows reduced form estimates and IV-estimates
for discontinuity samples of one, two and three years around 1959. For each discontinuity
sample, we show the results of a linear and quadratic specification of age.
All point estimates in Table 2 suggest a negative effect of conscription on investment
in human capital. However, the estimated effects on years of schooling and on the proba-
bility of obtaining a degree of higher professional education are statistically insignificant.
The estimated effects on obtaining a university degree show a different picture; military
conscription harms the probability of obtaining a university degree. Males born in 1959
are 1.5 percentage points more likely to obtain a university degree than those born in
Figure 3 Completion of tertiary education of males by birth cohort adjusted for time trend.
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Figure 4 Log gross annual wages of males by birth cohort adjusted for time trend.
the adjacent three years. This implies that the system of military conscription causes a
reduction of university education completion from 12.3 to 10.8 per cent. If there had not
been a system of military conscription, the proportion of male university graduates in
the adjacent three cohorts before and after 1959 would have been 1.5 percentage points
higher. This reduction probably induces substantial societal costs as tertiary education
is often considered to be important for social welfare and economic growth (Hanushek
andWoessmann 2008). The IV-estimates are obtained through a rescaling of the reduced
form estimates with the proportion of conscripts per birth cohort. These estimates sug-
gest that the impact for the compliers, those that would serve if they were not born in
Table 2 Reduced form and IV estimates of the effect of military service on investments in
human capital
±1 birth cohort ±2 birth cohorts ±3 birth cohorts
Years of completed education (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.019 -0.026 -0.041 -0.044 -0.059 -0.064
(0.044) (0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
IV -0.043 -0.059 -0.064 -0.069 -0.084 -0.091
(0.10) (0.10) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095) (0.095)
Higher professional education (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced Form -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
IV -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
University education (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0044)
IV -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.033***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age polynomials Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 17,605 17,605 29,228 29,228 40,481 40,481
Notes: Each cell is based on a separate regression of education on military conscription as specified in Equations (2) and (4).
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01.
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1959, is approximately 3-4 percentage points. The estimates are robust for the disconti-
nuity sample or the specification of age. The estimated effects do not change when we use
non-linear models instead of linear probability models.
In sum, we find that military conscription seems to have a substantial societal cost
by reducing the proportion of young males that obtain a university degree in the
Netherlands. In addition, conscription also generates private costs by reducing the prob-
ability of completing university education for conscripts. Our results are different from
earlier studies that found positive effects of military conscription on educational attain-
ment because of draft avoidance behaviour (Bauer et al. 2014; Card and Lemieux 2001;
Maurin and Xenogiani 2007). However, other studies also found negative effects of con-
scription on educational attainment (Buonanno 2006; Di Pietro 2013). A factor that might
be important in the Dutch context is that students that (temporarily) drop-out from
their university education have to fulfill their military service before being allowed to re-
enroll. This might have affected the proportion of university graduates as this creates an
interruption in the educational career of these students.
6.2 Conscription and earnings
The estimated effects of military conscription on (log) annual earnings are shown in
Table 3 using the same models and estimation samples as in Table 2. The reduced form
estimates show that males born in 1959 earn, on average, 1.5 per cent more than those
born in the adjacent one, two or three years. This implies that an abolishment of the
Table 3 Reduced form and IV estimates of the effect of military service on log annual
wages1
± 1 birth cohort ± 2 birth cohorts ± 3 birth cohorts
Log annual wages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.013* -0.013* -0.017** -0.015** -0.019*** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
IV -0.031* -0.029* -0.036** -0.032* -0.038** -0.033**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Log annual wages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.013* -0.011 -0.015** -0.013* -0.016** -0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
IV -0.028* -0.026 -0.033** -0.029* -0.034** -0.028*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Control: Years of education 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log annual wages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.008 -0.007 -0.012* -0.010 -0.014** -0.011*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
IV -0.019 -0.017 -0.024 -0.021 -0.028* -0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Control: University education 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.331*** 0.331***1
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Age polynomials linear quadratic linear quadratic linear quadratic
Observations 17,605 17,605 29,228 29,228 40,481 40,481
Notes: Each cell is based on a separate regression of wages on military conscription as specified in Equations (2) and (4).
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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system of compulsory military service would increase average male earnings for these
cohorts by 1.5 per cent. At the individual level, the long term cost of conscription for com-
pliers is approximately 3 to 4 per cent. The average age in our sample is approximately 38
years, which implies that 18 years after conscription, men that had to serve as recruits still
earn 3-4 per cent less than those who didn’t. Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) estimate
a negative effect of 4-5 per cent on wages 10 years after conscription.
6.3 Conscription, education and earnings
Next we investigate to what extent the negative effect of conscription on wages is driven
by the effects on educational attainment. In Table 3 estimates are shown of the ‘wage’
models that include years of schooling (middle panel) or university degree (lower panel)
as additional controls. These controls aim to pick up the effects of conscription that work
through education. Hence, the remaining effects of conscription on wages are not driven
by differential investments in human capital. The estimates show that the estimated effect
of conscription reduces after controlling for years of schooling or controlling for com-
pletion of university education. However, the effect of conscription on earnings remains
substantial and statistically significant. This suggests that conscription also reduces indi-
vidual earnings capacities through other channels other than human capital obtained in
the schooling system.
7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the previous findings. First, we will esti-
mate the same models as Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) using individual level data
until 2002. Thesemodels not only exploit the variation from the birth cohort 1959 but also
the variation inmilitary conscription between other birth cohorts. Second, we re-estimate
the mainmodels for the sample of women. As women are exempted frommilitary service,
we do no expect differences between birth cohorts. This analysis can be considered as a
placebo test for our main estimates. Third, we will investigate how the drop in university
graduates for birth cohort 1958 affects our estimates.
7.1 Replication of Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995)
Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) exploited two types of variation. First, they used the
variation in the proportion of conscripts from 14 birth cohorts. Second, they used the
variation in the proportion that received a special exemption status. The special exemp-
tion status was first introduced for birth cohort 1958. Therefore, Imbens and van der
Klaauw (1995) did not use the birth cohorts 1956 and 1957 in the analysis that exploited
this type of variation. In our replication, we use exactly the same variation and the same
birth cohorts as Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995). Table 4 shows the estimation results
of the effects of military conscription on educational attainment and earnings using the
same specifications as Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995). The estimation sample con-
sists of individuals from 14 birth cohorts. The estimation results in the first row for each
dependent variable (conscripted) exploit variation in the proportion of individuals within
birth cohorts that actually served. The estimation results in the second row (status ‘spe-
cial exemption’) exploit variation in the proportion of individuals within birth cohorts
that did not serve due to a ‘special exemption’ status. We estimated Equation (4) from
Section (4), which included the proportion of young men that served or the proportion
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Table 4 IV-estimates of the long term effect of conscription on education and earnings
using themodel of (1995)
Years of completed education (1) (2)
Conscripted -0.080 -0.075
(0.085) (0.086)
Status ‘special exemption’ 0.046 0.046
(0.051) (0.051)
Higher professional education (1) (2)
Conscripted -0.013 -0.012
(0.013) (0.013)
Status ‘special exemption’ 0.010 0.010
University education (1) (2)
Conscripted -0.022** -0.018*
(0.0097) (0.0097)
Status ‘special exemption’ 0.014** 0.015***
(0.0058) (0.0058)
Log annual wages (1) (2)
Conscripted -0.078*** -0.036**
(0.015) (0.015)
Status ‘special exemption’ 0.014 0.019**
(0.0090) (0.0090)
Age polynomials Linear Quadratic
Notes: Each cell is based on a separate regression and uses variation in the proportion of conscripts or variation in the
proportion having special exemption status between cohorts. The number of observations in the first regression is 73,892;
for the second type of regressions this is 62,243 (the birth cohorts of 1956 and 1957 are not included). Standard errors in
parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
of young men that had a special exemption status within birth cohorts as the main inde-
pendent variable. We estimated these models using a linear or a quadratic specification of
age. The estimation results in Table 4 confirm the previous findings. Serving in the army
has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect on years of schooling and graduation
from higher professional education. Serving in the army reduces the probability of obtain-
ing a university degree and also reduces long term earnings. These effects are statistically
significant for both types of variation with one exemption. The size of the effects on uni-
versity completion is somewhat smaller than the results from the local approach. The
effects on wages are comparable when using a quadratic specification. In sum, exploiting
all variation between birth cohorts gives similar results, but the effects on university edu-
cation are smaller. This implies that the variation used from cohorts further away from
the policy change that affected the birth cohort of 1959 has less impact on the completion
of university education. This variation is, however, less well understood than the variation
used in the analysis of Section 6.
7.2 Placebo test on women
Conscription was compulsory for men, but not for women. If other factors are impor-
tant for the schooling or wage differences between birth cohorts, these factors might also
affect schooling and earnings of women. To investigate the importance of other factors,
we re-estimate the main models from Tables 2 and 3 using a sample of women only. The
results are shown in Table 5. The estimates of the effect on obtaining a university degree
are close to zero and sometimes positive. This suggest that the difference in obtaining a
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Table 5 Reduced form and IV estimates of conscription on sample of women (sensitivity)
±1 birth cohort ±2 birth cohorts ±3 birth cohorts
University education (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
IV 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Log annual wages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
IV -0.028 -0.031 -0.023 -0.025 -0.016 -0.025
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
Age polynomials Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 12,761 12,761 21,448 21,448 29,960 29,960
Each cell is based on a separate regression of education and wages on military conscription as specified in Equations (2) and
(4). Standard errors in parentheses.
university degree for males born in 1959 and males born in adjacent years is not driven
by unobserved factors that increase university enrolment for those born in 1959. We also
do not find statistically significant effects on female wages. Hence, we do not find evi-
dence for the importance of unobserved factors that might have an effect on educational
attainment or earnings.
It should be noted that this placebo test is not completely clean as women may have
been indirectly affected by military conscription. For instance, women might face less
competition from men on the labour market due to conscription. Moreover, for married
women, there might be substitution or income effects related to the direct effects of con-
scription on their husbands. These indirect effects will probably be more important for
women’s wages than for the education of women because of the timing of the effects.
7.3 A lower proportion of university graduates in birth cohort 1958
Our model relies on the assumption that men born in birth year 1959 are similar to those
in the adjacent years. However, Figure 3 shows that the proportion of university graduates
is remarkably lower for those born in 1958 than in adjacent birth cohorts. This may affect
our estimates of the effect of conscription on university graduation. Therefore we conduct
two sensitivity analyses. First, we re-estimate the effect of military service on the proba-
bility to complete university education while excluding birth cohort 1958 and including
an earlier birth cohort. The estimates are shown in the upper panel of Table 6. Second,
we pool the data of males and females and estimate specifications of Equations (2) and (4)
that include a dummy for males and an interaction between birth cohort 1959 and males.
Hence, this provides a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of conscription on
completion of education. The lower panel of Table 6 shows the difference-in-differences
estimates for Equations (2) and (4). We observe that the estimates in both panels are
very similar to the estimates in Table 2. This implies that the drop in the proportion of
university graduates of birth cohort 1958 does not affect the main estimation results.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigated the long-term effect of military conscription on educational
attainment and wages by exploiting a policy change that exempted a complete birth
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Table 6 Sensitivity analysis of the effect of conscription on university graduation
±1 birth cohort ±2 birth cohorts ±3 birth cohorts
Panel 1: Excluding birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 1958
Reduced form -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0045)
IV -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.028** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.033***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 17,527 17,527 29,059 29,059 40,367 40,367
Panel 2: Difference-in-differences (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
estimates
Reduced form -0.018** -0.018** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
IV -0.040** -0.040** -0.039** -0.039** -0.031** -0.031**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Age polynomials Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Observations 30,366 30,366 50,676 50,676 70,441 70,441
Notes: In Panel 1, each cell is based on a separate regression of education on military conscription as specified in
Equations (2) and (4) on a sample excluding birth cohort 1958 and including an earlier birth cohort. In Panel 2, each column
shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of conscription using the pooled sample of men and women.
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05.
cohort from military service. We compare the educational outcomes and earnings of the
exempted cohort with the outcomes of men from adjacent cohorts. This local approach
yields estimates of the societal costs of a system of military conscription and estimates of
the private costs for individuals that had to serve in the military. Our approach is related
to previous work by Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995), who investigated the effects of
conscription on wages of conscripts until 1990.
We find that the system of compulsory military service decreases the proportion of uni-
versity graduates by 1.5 percentage points from a baseline of 12.3 per cent. In addition,
being a conscript reduces the probability of obtaining a university degree by almost four
percentage points. Our estimates also show that the system of military service reduces
average societal wages by 1.5 per cent. The private costs for conscripts are higher; they
lose approximately 3 to 4 per cent of their wages by serving in the military. The fact that
the average man in our sample served in the army almost 18 years before suggests that
the negative effects of military service are long-lasting. Finally, we find that the effect of
conscription on educational attainment does not fully explain the wage reduction. This
suggests that conscription also reduces individual earnings capacity through channels
other than a reduction in human capital.
This study provides a new piece of evidence about the hidden costs of conscription.
Our estimates show that military conscription has long term negative consequences for
completion of university education and for individual earnings. This implies that the
costs of conscription are substantial, both at the societal level and at the individual level.
Moreover, the private costs of conscription seem to be long-lasting.
Endnotes
1A recent study finds no effect on university enrolment of the abolition of compulsory
military service in Italy (Di Pietro 2013).
2Although the Netherlands abandoned military conscription in 1997, every Dutch
man still has a military obligation. Since 1997 however, recruits are no longer called to
serve. We may regard this as a 100 per cent exemption rate.
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3This description refers to the the procedures and ages in regard to the military
conscription after the policy change in 1977.
4Gelman and Imbens (2014) advocate the use of local approaches in regression
discontinuity models and show that estimates based on higher-order polynomials of the
forcing variable can be misleading.
5“LSO” is an abbreviation of the Dutch word “Loonstructuuronderzoek”.
Abbreviation
LSO: Loonstructuuronderzoek (Wage Structure Survey).
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Economics is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare
that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgments
We thank the editor Pierre Cahuc and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments.
Responsible editor: Pierre Cahuc.
Author details
1Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam, Netherlands. 2Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 3IZA Bonn,
Bonn, Germany.
Received: 6 November 2014 Accepted: 26 January 2015
References
Angrist JD (1990) Lifetime earnings and the vietnam era draft lottery: Evidence from social security administrative records.
Am Econ Rev 80(3):313–336
Angrist JD, Chen SH, Song J (2011) Long-term consequences of Vietnam-era conscription: New estimates using social
security data. Am Econ Rev 101(3):334–338
Angrist JD, Krueger AB (1994) Why do World War II veterans earn more than nonveterans? Am Econ Rev 12(1):74–97
Bauer TK, Bender S, Paloyo AR, Schmidt CM (2012) Evaluating the labor-market effects of compulsory military service. Eur
Econ Rev 56(4):814–829
Bauer TK, Bender S, Paloyo AR, Schmidt CM (2014) Do guns displace books? the impact of compulsory military service on
educational attainment. Econ Lett 124(3):513–515
Buonanno P (2006) Long-term effects of conscription: Lessons from the UK. University of Bergamo, Department of
Economics, Working Paper 0604
Card D, Lemieux T (2001) Going to college to avoid the draft: The unintended legacy of the Vietnam War. Am Econ Rev
91(2):97–102
Cipollone P, Rosolia A (2007) Social interactions in high school: Lessons from an earthquake. Am Econ Rev 97(3):948–965
Di Pietro G (2013) Military conscription and university enrolment: Evidence from Italy. J Population Econ 26(2):619–644
Duindam S (1995) Militaire dienstplicht: Een economische analyse van de personeelscomponent in de krijgsmacht.
Dissertation, University of Limburg
Gelman A, Imbens G (2014) Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 2505
Grenet J, Hart RA, Roberts E (2010) Above and beyond the call. Long-term real earnings effects of British male military
conscription in the post-war years. Labour Econ 18:194–204
Hanushek EA, Woessmann L (2008) The role of cognitive skills in economic development. J Econ Literature 46(3):607–668
Hoffenaar J, Schoenmaker B (1994) Met de blik naar het oosten: De Koninklijke Landmacht 1945-1990. Historical Section
of the Royal Netherlands Army, The Hague
Imbens G, van der Klaauw W (1995) Evaluating the cost of conscription in the Netherlands. J Bus Econ Stat 13(2):207–215
Keller KR, Poutvaara P, Wagener A (2009) Does military draft discourage enrollment in higher education? Evidence from
OECD countries. IZA discussion paper 4399
Lau M, Poutvaara P, Wagener A (2004) The dynamic cost of the draft. German Econ Rev 5(4):381–406
Maurin E, Xenogiani T (2007) Demand for education and labor market outcomes: Lessons from the abolition of
compulsory conscription in France. J Human Resour 42(4):795–819
Poutvaara P, Wagener A (2011) The political economy of conscription. In: Coyne CJ, Mathers RL (eds). The Handbook on
the Political Economy of War. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK). pp 154–172
Poutvaara P, Wagener A (2007) To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of
military conscription. Eur J Political Economy 23(4):975–987
Siminski P (2013) Employment effects of army service and veterans’ compensationevidence from the Australian
Vietnam-era conscription lotteries. Rev Econ Stat 95(1):87–97
